Non-Technical Summary
In the second half of 2011, the euro area sovereign debt crisis exacerbated, funding and deleveraging pressures on euro area banks raised the risk of credit supply disruptions a¤ecting the …nancing of …rms and households. Against this background, the ECB increased the length of the re…nancing operations with …xed rate tenders and full allotment in December 2011 and February 2012 to 3-years with the aim to support bank lending and counteract the risks of disorderly bank deleveraging process.
This study aims at assessing the macroeconomic implications of the 3-year longterm re…nancing operations (LTROs) conducted by the ECB in December 2011 and This money market resilience is consistent with the fact that bank funding risks were e¤ectively reduced by the ECB measures announced on 8 December 2011, because the 3-year LTROs provided a window of opportunity for banks to deleverage in a more orderly fashion and to increase their liquidity and capital bu¤ers in a sustainable manner.
Introduction
The identi…cation of non-standard monetary policy shocks is still an uncharted territory. Identifying non-standard monetary policy shocks is a key challenge for econometricians, not least as these measures are somewhat unprecedented in modern central banking history and as the instruments vary widely across the various non-standard measures. An extensive theoretical literature has discussed the various policy alternatives, when the policy rate hit the zero lower bound. By contrast, the empirical literature is only gradually emerging as data are collected and solutions to identi…ca-tion issues are found.
A growing number of empirical papers have focused on the impact of non-standard measures on asset prices through portfolio balance e¤ects. There is no doubt that policy measures have reduced bond yields, particularly when they are announced.
However, the …rst-order objective of the non-standard measures is to support the …nancial intermediation process to avoid the mistakes of the early 1930s.
In fact, the European Central Bank (ECB) non-standard monetary policy measures implemented through the crisis are complementary to interest rate decisions and are essentially predicated on the basis of emerging …nancial frictions in the credit intermediation sector which impair the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The model is estimated using quarterly series over the period 2003Q1-2011Q4 for the largest eleven euro area countries or for eight countries excluding Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which are under the …nancial assistance program. The main advantage of the shorter sample period, which is due to BLS-data availability, is that our results are less subject to the Lucas critique (that is, historical relationships are prone to break down in novel circumstances) as the model is estimated starting from the pre-crisis common expansionary cycle, which is behind the recent global economic and …nancial crisis.
Based on the estimated panel-VAR, the macroeconomic impact of the 3-year LTROs is computed in two steps. First, regarding the identi…cation of credit supply shocks, we use two alternative methods based on short-run exclusion restrictions: the recursive (Sims, 1980 ) and the sign restriction (Uhlig, 2005 ; Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, Zha, 2010). The two identi…cation schemes implemented in the paper deliver comparable macroeconomic propagation of credit supply disturbances and similar explanatory power on euro area economic developments through the crisis. Such similarities are worth emphasizing given the strong conceptual and technical di¤erences between the two identi…cation strategies.
Second, the e¤ect of the 3-year LTROs is assumed to be exclusively attributed to the credit supply shocks estimated for the …rst half of 2012 either using the unpublished ad-hoc questionnaire of the BLS in February 2012 or the published April 2012 survey round. The results based on both surveys and alternative identi…cation schemes turn out to be strikingly similar. The counterfactual experiment points to a hump-shaped response of euro area real GDP in level reaching a peak by mid-2013 at 0.5-0.8 percentage points depending on data used to identify the shock and identi…cation methods. By end-2014, real GDP remains signi…cantly above baseline. The e¤ects on in ‡ation materialize with some lag with the annual in ‡ation rate increasing by 0.15-0.25 percentage points at the peak in the beginning of 2014. Turning to credit variables, the outstanding amount of bank loans to non-…nancial corporations responds very gradually with maximum e¤ects recorded in the second half of 2014, almost two years later than for GDP, at around 1.7-2.5 percentage points above baseline. At the same time, the lending rate spread declines by 10-20 basis points in the …rst quarters, reverting back to zero by mid-2014.
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The empirical analysis on the impact of the 3-year LTROs assumes that the main transmission channel of this non-standard monetary policy measure works through the mitigation of liquidity and funding risks in the euro area banking system which ultimately contributes to relax bank lending standards and supports the …nancing of the economy at large. The moderate narrowing of lending rate spreads compared with the improvement of economic activity and loan provision suggests that the relaxation of credit standards due to the 3-year LTROs is more related to a quantitative easing of loan supply. The converging outcomes obtained regardless of the data and identi…cation methods used reinforce the plausibility of our interpretation that 3-year LTROs acted as a favorable credit supply shock.
We also provide alternative counterfactual experiments in order to assess the robustness of the mentioned results. We replace in the panel-VAR the BLS variable on credit standards by the aggregation of three factors explaining credit standards in the BLS questionnaire: banks'liquidity position, banks'capital position and banks' ability to access market …nancing. Focusing the credit supply indicators on the most acute sources of bank vulnerabilities during the …nancial crisis is supportive of the qualitative results mentioned previously, even increasing our measurement of the effectiveness of ECB's non-standard measures.
We also broaden the impact assessment of the 3-year LTRO beyond its e¤ect on the bank lending transmission channel by incorporating in the panel-VAR …nancial variables likely to capture factors related to economic risk perception and risk aversion. A popular indicator used in the macro-…nancial empirical literature is the VIX, an index of stock market option-implied volatility. This exercise shows that the quantitative assessment would not signi…cantly change by controlling for …nancial variables in the panel-VAR system or broadening the transmission channel of the 3-year LTROs to risk aversion and uncertainty.
Turning to the closely related literature, the e¤ects of the non-standard measures introduced by the ECB on macroeconomic variables computed using VAR methods are also studied by Lenza, et Speci…cally, Peersman (2011) suggests to identify the non-standard measures using bank loans. The non-standard monetary policy shock is identi…ed as the innovation to credit supply (i.e. higher bank loans with lower lending rates) orthogonal to the policy rate innovations. The transmission of such shock does not have the same feature of the transmission of a standard monetary policy shock. It has the same humpshaped response of output and a permanent but delayed response of prices, with the propagation being generally more sluggish, but an expansionary shock passes on the bank lending through a decline in the lending rate spreads of banks, while this spreads increases signi…cantly after a fall in the policy rate. The impact of the non-standard policy shock estimated by Peersman (2011) has the same transmission mechanism of his credit multiplier shock, which is an innovation that shifts the supply of bank loans, and our credit supply shock estimated using the BLS credit tightening information. Gambacorta, et al. (2012) , following the approach used by Peersman (2011), identify the non-standard measure using directly the central bank balance sheets and estimating a panel of eight advanced economies since the onset of the global …nancial crisis. To identify the shock, they assume that an unexpected increase in central banks'liquidity supply is associated with unexpected lower aggregate …nancial market volatility measured by the implied stock market volatility index (VIX). By means of such identi…cation scheme, they show that an exogenous increase in central bank balance sheet at the zero lower bound is expansionary, but this is also because a lower VIX is generally associated with better economic perspectives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the VAR method and data. Section 3 shows the relative importance of the credit supply shock on the euro area macroeconomic variables under alternative identi…cation strategy. Section 4 discusses the key results focusing on the macroeconomic impact of the identi…ed non-standard 3-years LTROs shock. Section 5 concludes.
instead makes use of the ECB bank balance sheet. By comparing the forecasts of the main macro variables conditional to the observed path of the ECB bank balance sheet and a no-policy scenario in which the ECB balance sheet is projected to develop conditional to the macroeconomic environment, they conclude that in the absence of the ECB intervention, the macroeconomic activity in the euro area would have been more depressed. This identi…cation scheme has two shortcomings: (1) the forecast of the ECB balance sheet is conditional to a macroeconomic environment that has already been a¤ected by the policy measure; (2) the comparison of the two scenarios is comparable to a generalized impulse response function rather than an impulse from an identi…ed structural shock. 
where y i;t is a k 1 vector of variables of each of the i countries, i = 1; :::I, i
is an individual-speci…c, unobservable, …xed e¤ect and B (L) is a lag polynomial with the VAR coe¢ cients. The disturbances, " i;t , have zero means and variance,
The presence of i and y i;t 1 make least square estimation of equation (1) It is important to stress that variables lagged twice are used as instrument for the …rst-di¤erenced equation.
The data set
We bring the model to the data by considering historical series of quarterly data Economic activity is measured by quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth, while in‡ation is measured by quarter-on-quarter GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation. As for the monetary policy stance, it is common to employ the EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average) rate (see Cicarelli, et al., 2010) . 2 The EONIA is a weighted average of overnight Euro
Interbank O¤er Rates for inter-bank loans. In mid-2011, the very high demand for overnight liquidity by banks pushed the EONIA rate above the EURIBOR, which is the rate at which euro area banks lend to each other on an unsecured basis. Conversely, the 3-month OIS (Overnight Index Swap) rate, which is an interest rate swap whose ‡oating leg is tied to an overnight rate, does not su¤er from sharp movement due to technical reasons. Therefore, it is a preferable rate to measure the monetary policy stance (see Figure 1 ).
[insert Figure 1 ten questions centre on supply factors, of which seven look at credit standards and three at terms and conditions. Of the questions on credit standards, three refer to banks'liquidity position, access to market funding and capital position, which are the most acute sources of bank vulnerabilities during the …nancial crisis a¤ecting credit supply. We will also make use of this more restrictive de…nition of BLS credit supply factor to identify the credit supply shocks. Among the factors that may a¤ect loan demand, various factors related to …nancing needs and the use of alternative …nance are mentioned. Seven questions focus explicitly on loan demand, of which three look at demand from enterprises and four at demand from households. Overall, 13 backward and four forward-looking questions are included, in order to capture both recent and expected developments.
The BLS demand and supply factors to NFCs for the euro area as a whole as well as for the individual countries that have allowed publication are plotted in Figure 2 .
The net percentage for the questions on supply of loans refers to the di¤erence between the sum of the percentages for "tightened considerably" and "tightened somewhat"
and the sum of the percentages for "eased somewhat" and "eased considerably".
The net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are de…ned as the di¤er-ence between the sum of the percentages for "increased considerably"and "increased somewhat"and the sum of the percentages for "decreased somewhat"and "decreased [insert Figure 2 here]
The average correlation among the variables is in most cases strongly statistically signi…cant (see Table 1 ), which suggests that the VAR methodology is needed to extract the expected correlations useful to identify the "surprises". As for the lag length, the Schwarz information criterion suggests the use of one lag.
[insert Table 1 here]
Panel unit root tests
Given that the traditional GMM estimator works very badly if the variables are I(1), we report in Table 2 , employ a null hypothesis of a unit root, while the Hadri test uses a null of no unit root. Except for the 3-month OIS and the lending rate spread, the unit root hypothesis is highly rejected. The non-stationarity of the policy rate and the lending rate spread is simply due to the very high persistence of both time series (see Figure   1 ). Therefore, we can assume them stationary. It would be unrealistic to believe that such rates were non-stationary.
[insert Table 2 here]
Credit supply shocks and economic ‡uctuations
In this section, we identify credit supply shocks in the panel-VAR and analyze the macroeconomic propagation mechanism of such economic disturbances together with their contribution to euro area cyclical developments over the last decade.
Impulse response function of a credit supply shock
Structural interpretation of VAR models requires additional identifying assumptions.
We use thereafter two alternative short-run exclusion restriction methods: a traditional recursive identi…cation scheme and one based on sign restrictions.
Recursive identi…cation
Error terms of a VAR are typically correlated across equations. By computing the Cholesky factorization of the reduced form VAR covariance matrix P , we "orthogonalize" the reduced-form innovations and estimate the structural shocks (Sims, 1980) . Speci…cally, once estimated B (L), we can recover the disturbances, " i;t , and identify the structural shocks i;t as follows: i;t = A 1 " i;t , where A is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of the residual variance-covariance matrix.
It is common in the monetary transmission literature to order output and prices before the policy rate for two reasons: …rst, output growth and in ‡ation are assumed to react only with one lag to a monetary policy shock; second, contemporaneous innovations which are common to output growth and the policy rate or in ‡ation and the policy rate are not recorded as monetary policy innovations. Given the key role of credit intermediation during the recent crisis, the policy-makers gave importance to the results of the BLS in their policy decisions. Therefore, we have ordered them before the policy rate with the notion that the policy-makers can respond immediately after the release of the BLS results. As pointed out by Ciccarelli (2010) , this identi…cation of the monetary policy shock takes into account the forward looking character of the survey. All in all, the variables are ordered as follows: Real GDP growth, GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation, BLS demand factor, BLS supply factor, lending rate to NFCs-3-month OIS, 3-month OIS, loan growth to NFCs. However, the results are qualitatively similar whether the BLS supply factor is ordered last or …rst.
The impulse response functions of the credit supply shock are presented in Figure   3 . The results suggests that real GDP declines for about 3 years with a loss amounting to 0.6 percentage points at the peak if the panel is estimated using 8 countries and Finally, the lending rate spreads reacts relatively little compared with the contraction in GDP and loans. Such a mild response indicates that the identi…cation of the credit supply shocks through the BLS answers on credit standards is likely to gear the transmission towards quantitative bank lending channels related to non-price terms and conditions. Here again, the bene…ts of relying on BLS information to identify credit supply shocks are clear.
Identi…cation by sign restrictions
Identi…cation in sign-identi…ed models requires that each identi…ed shock is associated with a unique sign pattern. We employ the approach of Uhlig (2005), but adopt the algorithm of Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010), as the latter is more e¢ cient in dealing with sign restrictions on impulse responses to a number of structural shocks.
If several structural shocks must be identi…ed, Uhlig's algorithm searches for the orthogonal matrix column by column recursively. During this search, the orthogonal matrix may not be found for some draws, either from the bootstrap procedure or from the posterior distribution. Conversely, Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha' algorithm keep all the posterior draws in practice and the orthogonal matrix is simply a draw from the uniform (or Haar) distribution with only a single operation of the 13 QR decomposition. 3 These di¤erences make Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha' algorithm more e¢ cient when several shocks are to be identi…ed.
The basic steps are the following:
(1) Draw a set of unrestricted parameters A from the posterior distribution (inverse Wishard for the covariance matrix P and Normal for the reduced form parameters B).
(2) For each draw of A, compute P and B. The Bayesian approach requires forming a prior for the reduced-form VAR. We employ P and B estimated using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator.
Following Peersman (2012), we identify three main shocks: a credit supply shock, a monetary policy shock and an aggregate demand shock. However, while Peersman The impulse response functions of the credit supply shock are presented in Figure   4 . Beyond the scaling of the shock, the results suggests a high degree of similarities with respect to the previous shock identi…cation. First, the dynamic responses of output and loan do comfort previous …ndings, regarding the delayed response of loans or peak GDP e¤ects after 5 to 6 quarters. Second, the identi…cation with sign restriction also con…rms the stronger impact on loans than on GDP of credit supply disturbances. From peak to peak, loans react by 3.5 times more than GDP, precisely like in the recursive identi…cation scheme. Third, the in ‡ationary e¤ects of the credit supply shock is very close to the one obtained previously for a given output e¤ect, albeit somewhat more persistent.
[insert Figure 4 here]
At the same time, some striking di¤erences should be noticed. It appears that the sign restriction scheme delivers on impact a milder response of the BLS answer on credit standards but stronger responses of BLS answers on loan demand and loan rate spreads. In comparison, the recursive identi…cation scheme may therefore impose some strong assumptions on the instantaneous response of the BLS supply variable.
The next section, which analyses the historical decomposition of the shock, will also assess whether these di¤erences signi…cantly a¤ected the model-based assessment on the role of credit supply shocks in the euro area business cycle.
Credit supply factors during the …nancial crisis
We now turn to the economic importance of credit supply disturbances in the euro area business cycle. The results from the recursive identi…cation scheme are analyzed …rst, followed by the comparison with the sign restriction outcomes. tensions were strongly contributing to higher net tightening of credit standards (see Figure 5 ).
[insert Figure 5 here] Clearly, the credit supply shocks are found to be important drivers of the BLS answer on credit standards. However, in some periods, the credit supply disturbances
were not fully explaining the developments in this BLS variable. In 2010, notably, the overall answers of banks were pointing to more neutral stance on bank lending Turning now to the in-sample structural decomposition implied by the sign restriction identi…cation scheme, the results are presented and systematically compared with the previous ones in Figure 5 for the BLS variables and in Figure 7 for goods and credit markets variables. One striking similarity concerns the historical decomposition of GDP, loans and to a lesser extent in ‡ation. As suggested by the comparison of impulse response functions, the two identi…cation schemes attribute almost the same impact of credit supply tensions on activity and lending through the crisis, whereas the contribution to in ‡ation dynamics appears broadly similar but somewhat more pronounced with sign restrictions. On the BLS variables, the results are qualitatively comparable but on credit standards in particular, the contribution of credit supply shocks identi…ed with sign restrictions turns out to be more moderate and less volatile.
Finally, the historical decompositions of lending rate spreads display more pronounced di¤erences with the sign restrictions attributing stronger credit supply e¤ects. These di¤erences on BLS credit standards and lending spread variables correspond to the ones illustrated when comparing the impulse response functions.
[insert Figure 7 here] Overall, the two identi…cation schemes implemented in this paper deliver comparable macroeconomic propagation and similar explanatory power on euro area economic developments through the crisis. Such similarities are worth emphasizing given the strong conceptual and technical di¤erences between the two identi…cation strategies. At the same time, one must acknowledge that other channels may potentially be ignored by our identi…cation strategy. For example, non-standard measures may also be perceived as commitment devices from the monetary authority on its readiness to act and ability to deliver on its mandate, when the room for further accommodation through standard monetary policy instrument is narrow. Such expectational channels are absent from the analysis presented in this paper; thereby we might neglect potentially powerful transmission mechanisms of the 3-year LTROs.
Additional transmission channels, which go beyond or by-pass the provision of loans by the banking system, are connected to the e¤ects of the 3-year LTROs on macroeconomic risk distribution and on the price of risk. At the end of this section, we conduct an additional scenario to make the point.
Interpreting the 3-year LTROs as the unexpected credit supply shock in the …rst half of 2012
In this section, the evaluation of the 3-year LTRO impact on the euro area macroeconomy will be conducted along two simulation exercises. First, the e¤ect of the non-standard measure is assumed to be exclusively attributed to the credit supply 
Focusing the credit supply channels on liquidity risk and access to market funding
An additional simulation exercise aims at identifying the credit supply channel using some speci…c supply-side determinants of bank lending policy, such as banks'liquidity management, access to market funding and capital positions, information included in the BLS survey.
We replace in the panel-VAR the BLS answers on credit standards by the aggregation of these three speci…c supply factors. In doing so, the identi…ed credit supply shocks become more strictly related to banks' funding constraints, which the ECB policy aimed at relaxing.
Based on this new BLS variable, the panel-VAR is re-estimated using samples of 8 or 11 countries, the credit supply shock is identi…ed as before and the simulation is 
Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to assess the macroeconomic impact of the 3-year LTROs Notes: see Figure 4 . Notes: see Figure 5 . Levin, et al. (2002) . (5) Breitung (2000) . (6) Hadri (2000) .
